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A BSTRACT
There are serious challenges facing the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Two of these hindrances are that: firstly, the ICC has been accused of only
targeting the African continent; and secondly, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) has no enforcement mechanism
against the state parties who refuse to cooperate with the court. In light of
these challenges, the question is whether the ICC would be able to meet the
expectations of the international community. The significance of this study is to
contribute to the effort of making the ICC an independent, credible and
effective tribunal to end impunity for those who commit heinous crimes. This
paper seeks to assess the work and progress of the ICC since its inception in
2002. To achieve this, the paper will focus on the causes of nonimplementation of pending warrants of arrest and attempt to ascertain whether
the aforesaid warrants have had effects on the conditions that lead to: the
investigations by the ICC; the cases before the court which have, in my view,
compromised the integrity and autonomy of the ICC because of, inter alia, its
selective geographical prosecutions; convictions made by the court (if any);
the pillar of the ICC, namely cooperation from member States to the Rome
Statute that seems to be lacking; the future relationship between the African
Union and the ICC given the current tension between the two institutions; the
recent developments on the definition of the crime of aggression as a success
in pre-empting States from occupying other States outside the permissible
grounds under the Charter of the United Nations; and views on the proposed
introduction of the oversight mechanism for the ICC and recommendations on
how to improve the effectiveness of the Court.
INTRODUCTION
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Three hundred thousand people have been killed in Darfur, Sudan since
2003.
Conflicts in other parts of the world including the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and Colombia, continue to claim more
innocent lives. Kenneth Roth opined the inability of the international
community to punish perpetrators of heinous crimes as follows:
The cause of this century’s brutality is not simply the evil
that lies in some men’s hearts. It is our [collective] failure to
build on the Nuremberg precedent by ensuring that all such
killers are brought to justice. Too often since the Holocaust,
the cries of the victims have gone unanswered. . . . Too many
others responsible for the atrocities of this century continue
to enjoy impunity.175
174

Kenneth Roth’s assessment of the situation then is relevant even today: some
of the perpetrators indicted by the ICC for heartless crimes are walking freely,
including President Omar Hassan Al Bashir.176 In other cases, the warrants of
arrest have become stale.177 What does this signify to the victims, and will the
ICC be able to live to the expectations of the international community by
punishing those responsible for crimes that “shock the conscience of
humanity”?178 The inability or delay of any judicial institution to deliver
justice is a grave concern for those who look to the courts as the proper body to
bring justice.
It is against this background that the drafters of the Rome Statute
foresaw a need to incorporate a provision for review of the Statute after seven
years of operation, in order to address these concerns.179 The first Review
Conference was held in Kampala, Uganda on May 31, 2010 to reflect on eight
years of the ICC’s existence and to attend to outstanding issues such as the
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Court of South Africa under Justice Zak Yacoob, advocate of the High Court of South Africa
phookor@gmail.com. I am grateful to the editors, Matilda EK Lasseko-Phooko and Benard
Akang’o for comments.
174
UN News Centre, Fresh Clashes in Darfur Kill Dozens of Civilians, UN-African Union
Mission
Reports,
Sept.
7,
2011,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=35847&Cr=darfur&Cr= darfur&Cr1.
175
Kenneth Roth, Endorse the International Criminal Court, in 3 TOWARD AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 19 (Council on Foreign Relations ed., 1999).
176
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, Warrant of Arrest
(Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.
177
Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Ct., 64th Sess. Aug. 1, 2008-July 31, 2009, ¶¶ 23-24, U.N. Doc.
A/64/356 (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
C3FF0A887709D69E4925765D000A45E5-Full_Report.pdf.
178
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogen and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996).
179
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 123, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 183/9 (hereinafter, Rome Statute).
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crime of aggression on the Rome Statute.180 In his opening address, the
President of the Assembly of State Parties, Ambassador Christian Wenaweser,
boldly articulated that the international community is “looking at a functioning
judicial institution that had eluded [it] for decades.”181 He stated that the
conference “will take stock both of the achievements to this day and of the
challenges ahead”.182 Little did he know that his ambitions for a successful
permanent international criminal court would become a reality when the
delegates at the end of the symposium reached consensus on the definition of
the crime of aggression.183 The crime of aggression, and its jurisdiction, has
been a subject of a vigorous debate for centuries because there was no
agreement on its meaning.184 Even its inclusion in Article 3 of the Rome
Statute did not have significance because it was non-operational.185 It was
only on February 13, 2009 that the Special Working Group on Crime of
Aggression proclaimed that it had reached an agreement on a draft definition
of the crime of aggression, breaking five years of deliberation.186
The need for the creation of an independent and permanent
international criminal tribunal to end impunity by trying those responsible for
heinous crimes was first conceived at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.187
This idea became a reality on July 17, 1998 when 120 countries at the UN
Diplomatic Conference voted in favour of the Rome Statute.188 The ICC
became operational on July 1, 2002 after the Rome Statute was ratified by 60
countries.189 As of October 12, 2010, 114 States have ratified the Rome
Statute.190 The court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity,
180

Review conference of the Rome Statute, Int’l Crim. Ct., http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ASP/ ReviewConference/ (last visited November 20, 20110).
181
Christian Wenaweser, ICC Review Conference: Opening Remarks, Int’l Crim Ct.,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Statements/ICC-RC-statementsChristianWenaweser-ENG.pdf (last visited April 12, 2011).
182
Id.
183
ICC-ASP/13/Res. 6, (June 10, 2011) available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions /RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf
184
Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L. L. 71
(2010).
185
Art. 5(1) (d) of the Rome Statute lists the crime of aggression as one of the crimes subject
to the ICC jurisdiction. Art. 5(2) suspends the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
pending its definition and exercise of jurisdiction. The only crimes that may be brought
presently before the ICC include genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
186
Glennon, supra note 11, at 73.
187
Shingirai Maparura, Justice for Export: Africa and the International Criminal Court,
CONSULTANCY
AFRICA
INTELLIGENCE
July
2,
2010,
available
at
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=459:justice-for-export-africa-and-theinternational-criminal-court&catid=57:africa-watch-discussion-papers&Itemid=263.
188
Melisa K. Marle, The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional
Loopholes in the Rome Statute, 49 DUKE L.J. 825 (1999).
189
About
the
Court,
International
Criminal
Court,
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+ Court/.
190
The State Parties to the Rome Statute, International Criminal Court, http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ ASP/states+parties/.
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war crimes, and the crime of aggression.191 The ICC will not replace national
courts, but it will supplement them when they are “unwilling or unable” to
exercise jurisdiction over the world’s most wanted suspects.192
The purpose of this discourse is to assess the work and progress of the
ICC since its inception in 2002 to date. The study is important because it will
contribute towards making the ICC an independent, credible and effective
permanent international criminal court to end impunity. The paper will
conclude by providing proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the ICC and
ensure greater State cooperation with the permanent international criminal
court.
In Part I, I look at the pending warrants of arrest,193 the factors
contributing to the non-implementation, and their effects on the conditions that
lead into investigations by the ICC’s prosecutor. I also evaluate whether the
ICC’s targeting of low ranking officials is contributory to the nonimplementation of warrants of arrest.
Part II assesses the development of cases of the DRC,194 Central
African Republic (CAR),195 Sudan,196 Uganda,197 and Kenya198 before the
court. In particular, I contend that the ICC has made progress given the nature,
gravity and complexity of the offences. I also argue that the ICC has, to a
certain extent, compromised its credibility through its use of selective
prosecutions in Africa, and given no convictions in eight years, this situation is
unsatisfactory.
Part III contends that ‘cooperation from member States to the Rome
Statute199 is the pillar of the ICC.200 Consequently, the absence or lack of
191

See Rome Statute, art. 5. The crime of aggression was not defined at the time when the
Rome Statute entered into force and thus the court did not have jurisdiction. It was only on
July 11, 2010 that the definition was agreed upon, but the actual exercise of jurisdiction is
subject to a decision to be taken up on January 1, 2011.
192
Jennifer J. Llewellyn, A Comment on the Complementary Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court: Adding Insult to Injury in Transitional Contexts?, 24 DALHOUSIE L.J. 192
(2001). See also Rome Statute Art. 1, and Art. 17(2) (3).
193
Rep. of the ICC to the UN for 2008/09, supra note 4, at 10. The cases are in the
following countries: Uganda (Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic
Ongwen), Darfur (Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb), and the
DRC (Bosco Ntaganda).
194
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Warrant of Arrest
(Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc191959.pdf.
195
Id.
196
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of
Arrest (July 12, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf
(President Al Bashir is charged for genocide under Article 25(3) (a) of the Rome Statute).
197
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest (Sept. 27,
2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.pdf (charges include crimes
against humanity and war crimes).
198
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision authorizing
investigation (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf
(charges include war crimes).
199
Cooperation with the ICC is mentioned in various provisions of the Rome Statute
including art. 86 and art. 93.
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support will turn the ICC into an exorbitant, but toothless, international
criminal court situated at The Hague, Netherlands. The article also studies the
future relationship between the African Union (AU) and the ICC given the
current tension between the two institutions.
Part IV argues that the recent resolution on the definition of the crime
of aggression is an important success in pre-empting States from occupying
other countries outside the permissible grounds under the Charter of the United
Nations (UN Charter).201 The article also evaluates the seven theories that
describe the circumstances that would constitute an act of aggression and, inter
alia, the controversy brought by the discretion given to a state party to declare
that it does not accept jurisdiction of the ICC on the crime of aggression.202
Part V analyzes the achievements, challenges and failures discussed in
Parts I, II, III and IV. It concludes by indicating whether the work of the ICC
has been efficient or not. Ultimately, Part V makes recommendations for
introducing a system of state compliance to the Rome Statute in order to
enhance the effectiveness of the ICC and ensure greater state cooperation with
the permanent international criminal court.
PART I: PENDING WARRANTS OF ARREST
This section discusses warrants of arrest and the charges with respect to
each country. The absence of a police force in the ICC seems to be the main
obstacle in implementing warrants of arrest especially when the state
concerned is not willing to apprehend the indicted suspects. This is one of the
setbacks facing the court.
(a)

Sudan
Sudan’s case is unique in that the referral to the ICC was made by the
United Nations Security Council (Security Council).203 Further, Sudan has
signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. In Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad
200

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) experienced significant difficulties in their early stages and there were doubts on
whether they would deliver justice. The proceedings were costly and too long; hundreds were
charged, but only few were convicted. The courts later on considered plea bargaining for low
ranking officials in exchange for truth and testifying against “big fishes.” This worked briefly
but the court later on did not impose sentences recommended by the prosecutors. Rather, it
imposed harsher sentences. The accused person did not come forward as they realized that it
was no longer guaranteed that a confession and a plea of guilty would result in lenient
punishment. Currently, the tribunals are considering sending home accused low ranking
officials to stand trial in their countries due to the pressure from the United Nations to
complete trials by the end of 2010. See Alex Whiting, International Criminal Prosecutions,
Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered, 50 (2) HARV. INT’L. L.J. 323 (2009).
201

See U.N. Charter art. 51.
See ICC Res. 6, supra note 10, at art. 15.
203
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, To
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8551 (Mar. 31, 2005)
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm (last visited Apr. 9.
2011). See also Rome Statute, art. 13(b) (dealing with referrals by the Security Council).
202
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Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman,204 both warrants of arrest were
issued on May 2, 2007. The first accused is facing forty-nine charges for
crimes against humanity (murder of civilians in the Kodoom villages) and war
crimes (destruction of property).205 The second accused has to answer fiftyone similar charges which include rape.206 The perpetrators have been
fugitives since 2007.
In Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir207 the accused is the
first sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC.208 His warrants of arrest
were issued on May 4, 2009 and July 12, 2010 for genocide (amputation of
civilians and mental destruction) and crimes against humanity (torture)
respectively.209
The Sudanese case is also complex in that it raises the issue of state
sovereignty. The undisputed and clear obligation in terms of the Security
Council’s resolution is that the government of Sudan must arrest President Al
Bashir.210 The difficult with this obligation is that on one hand, the ICC has no
police force to arrest President Al Bashir. President Al Bashir is the sitting
Head of State who still has control of the police and army forces in his country.
It is unimaginable that he would order his forces to arrest himself.
Another difficulty is that state parties to the Rome Statute have to
cooperate with the ICC by bringing President Al Bashir to the ICC. However,
they also have to respect the principle of state or diplomatic immunity of a
person under Article 98 of the Rome Statute.211 Consequently, the conflict
faced by states is having to comply with the ICC while also having to respect
diplomatic immunity. It is submitted that the principle of State sovereignty
seems to be losing its superior status to human rights protection. As was
pointed out in Prosecutor v. Tadic,212 the International Criminal Tribunal for
204

Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun & Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Case
No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.pdf.
205
Id.
206
Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun & Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman,
Warrant of Arrest (Apr. 27, 2007) http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279858.pdf.
207
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, Warrant of
Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.
208
First International Arrest Warrant for Head of State Issued to Bashir Over Darfour
[Darfur],
WORLD
TRIBUNE,
(Mar.
5,
2009)
available
at
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/ WTARC/2009/af_sudan0188_03_05.asp (last
visited Apr. 12, 2011).
209
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second
Warrant of Arrest (July 12, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf.
210
See ICC Res. 6, supra note 10.
211
Rome Statute, art. 98 (1) provides that “[T]he Court may not proceed with a request for
surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that
third State for the waiver of the immunity.”
212
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), Judgment of 2 October
1995, 105 ILR 453.
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the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held that “it would be a travesty of law and
betrayal of the universal need for justice, should the concept of state
sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human rights.”213
This is further supported by the indictment of President Charles Taylor on
March 7, 2003 while he was still a sitting Head of State.214 He was, however,
arrested after resigning as President.215 Ultimately, the provision of Article 27
of the Rome Statute can also be invoked justifing the indictment of President
Al Bashir based on the principle that the law should apply equally to all of
those accused of grave crimes. 216
Given the current outstanding warrants of arrest, Sudan will arguably
neither ratify the Rome Statute in the near future, nor will President Al Bashir
authorise the arrest of his indicted commanders and himself. President Al
Bashir is not a fugitive because he walks freely and is seemingly innocent as
ever. He arguably also enjoys the lenient treatment from the African Union.
Further, this is one of the most unfortunate cases in the African continent
where leaders shield perpetrators regardless of the nature of the crimes
committed. Indeed, birds of a feather flock together. It is contented that one
of the reasons President Al Bashir is protected is because some of the African
leaders are, in one way or the other, also responsible for international crimes in
their respective countries. The situation in Sudan remains tense and the
victims have arguably lost faith in the justice system.
(b)

Uganda
Uganda has ratified the Rome Statute and it was President Yoweri
Museveni who referred the case to the ICC under Articles 13(a) and 14 of the
Statute to conduct investigations.217 Consequently, five warrants of arrest were
issued on July 8, 2005.218 After the international community had spent efforts
to apprehend Raska Lukwiya in order to answer nine criminal charges against
him in Prosecutor v. Raska Lukwiya,219 the accused cheated justice.220 He died

213

Andrea Bianchi, Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT’L. L.
237, 261 (1999) (explaining that state practice and the logic of generally accepted principles
display an inconsistency between the notion of international crimes and any form of immunity
that shields individuals behind their official position).
214
Prosecution v. Ghankay Taylor, SPECIAL CT. SIERRA LEONE, http://www.scsl.org/CASES/ ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
215
Id.
216
Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 27 (providing that “[T[his Statute shall apply equally
to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity
as [Head of State or Government] . . . in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility
under this Statute, nor shall it, in itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.”).
217
Abigal H. Moy, The International Criminal Court’s Arrest Warrants and Uganda’s
Lord’s Resistance Army: Renewing the Debate Over Amnesty and Complementarity, 19 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 267 (2006).
218
Id.
219
Prosecutor v. Raska Lukwiya, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05055, Warrant of Arrest (July 8,
2005), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97193.pdf.
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whilst still at large thus escaping counts of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.221 It is sad that someone who allegedly attacked civilians at the
refugee camps died without accounting for his evil deeds. His death has
denied the people of Uganda justice and truth on why their loved ones were
killed. In Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and
Dominic Ongwen,222 the accused are charged for war crimes (pillaging at a
redacted IDP camp) and all remain at large since 2005.
(c)

DRC
In Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda the accused is charged for war crimes
(recruitment of child soldiers under the age of fifteen).223 He is still on the run
from the long arm of the law since August 2006.224 Overall, there are seven
pending warrants issued during the 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009 periods.225
The principle of equality before the law set forth in Article 27 of the
Rome Statute has arguably been compromised in the DRC and Uganda in the
following respect: the Presidents, both in the DRC and Uganda, referred the
cases to the ICC prosecutor to conduct investigations against rebel leaders,
warlords and opposition leaders in the order of their ranking. The aforesaid
referrals should have been approached with utmost caution. They trigger
important questions. What about both presidents’ forces who have also
committed atrocities? Who is the senior commander of the army forces? Why
are the governments’ forces not being investigated including the Heads of
States? For example, towards the end of September 2009, “two thousand
civilians were slaughtered and over seven thousand women and girls were
raped by both rebels and government forces” in the North and East of
Congo.226 In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni has on various occasions

220

Cf. Stephanos Bibas & William Burke-White,, International Idealism Meets DomesticCriminal Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 639 (2010) (referring to Slobodan
Milosevic’s sudden death before facing war crimes verdict).
221
Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision to Terminate the Proceedings
Against
Raska
Lukwiya,
¶
10
(July
10,
2007),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc297945.pdf.
222
Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., available at http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+ and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0204/ (last visited Apr.
23, 2011).
223
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest (Aug. 22,
2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc305330.pdf.
224
Callixte Mbarushimana arrested in France for crimes against humanity and war crimes
allegedly committed in the Kivus (Democratic Republic of the Condo), INT’L CRIM. CT., (Oct.
11,
2010),
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20
(2010)/pr581.
225
See Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Ct., supra note 4.
226
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF
CONGO,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(2010)
http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2010/democratic-republic-congo-drc.
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ordered his security forces to “shoot and kill the civilians”.227 The troops are
also implicated in the killing and torture of the civilians in the remote area of
Karamoja as part of the “disarmament exercise.”228 These are serious crimes
alleged to have been committed by government forces that purport to be on a
peace keeping mission. It is thus submitted that this one-sided investigation
and prosecution hugely impacts on the execution of the warrants of arrest.
Further, it is contended that the heads of state are shielding their men from the
ICC. Consequently, as long as it is clear that the law is targeting select
individuals, it will be difficult to execute warrants of arrest and bring all
perpetrators to justice regardless of their official capacities.
The situation in the DRC and Uganda illustrates a clear case for
impunity of Heads of State, prosecution of selective “small fishes” and
disregard of equality before the law. Accordingly, Presidents Joseph Kabila
and Yoweri Museveni and their army officials should also be investigated
under the doctrine of command responsibility.229
The Sudanese situation truly reflects the objectives of the ICC because
the warrants of arrest have been issued against everyone who is suspected of
committing heinous crimes regardless of their office or rebel or political
affiliation. The suspects are still at large and changing their hiding places in
search of “save heavens [sic].”230 The Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) is said to be heavily recruiting soldiers in remote areas of central
Africa.231
PART II: CASES BEFORE THE COURT
There are currently four cases before the ICC referred by state parties
to the Rome Statute. However, the proceedings have experienced delays
because all of the accused are doing everything possible to prove their alleged
innocence.
(a) DRC
In Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubango case), Mr. Lubango
a Congolese national, is charged for war crimes that include enlisting children
227

Yoweri Museveni Orders Guards to Shoot and Kill Youth, FREE UGANDA, Mar. 17, 2010,
http://freeuganda.wordpress.com/2010/03/17/ugandayoweri-museveni-orders-guards-to-shootand-kill-youth.
228
Uganda Army Accused of Karamoja Torture Abuses, BBC NEWS AFRICA, Aug. 17, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10996764.
229
The command responsibility refers to a person (usually a military leader) who possesses
command authority. This leader may also be criminally responsible for crimes committed by
his subordinates if he or she fails to prevent the crimes despite having had knowledge that his
subordinates were about to commit such crimes.
230
Statement by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the International Criminal Court
(May
31,
2010),
available
at
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Statements/ICC-RC-statements-LuisMorenoOcampoENG.pdf.
231
Uganda LRA Rebels ‘on Massive Forced Recruitment Drive’, BBC NEWS AFRICA. Aug.
12, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10947791.
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under the age of fifteen and using them to actively participate in hostilities.232
He is alleged to be the founder and president of the Unions patriots congolais
(UPC) and Commander in Chief of its military wing, the Forces patriotiques
pour la liberation du Congo (FPLC).233 Mr. Lubanga is allegedly responsible
as a co-perpetrator of the aforesaid crimes.234 The case experienced numerous
delays because of Mr Lubanga’s challenge that a fair trial was not possible
because the prosecution did not disclose certain evidence to his defence and
the court.235 The trial chamber I upheld his challenge and stayed the
proceedings in June 2008.236 After being operational for seven years without a
single trial, January 26, 2009 marked the start of the first ever trial before the
ICC.237 The prosecution presented its evidence from January until July 14,
2009.238 It tendered 199 items of evidence and thirty witnesses testified before
the court.239 The defence started its case in October 2009.240 The case started
three years after Mr Lubanga’s arrest in March 2006.241 The commencement
of the first trial is arguably a huge step towards the creation of the court’s
jurisprudence.
In Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui242 the
accused allegedly jointly committed war crimes and crimes against humanity
which include sexual slavery, rape and attack of civilians, murder and
destruction of the enemy’s property through other persons, within the meaning
of Article 23, 3(a)243 of the Rome Statute.244 The pre-trial chamber confirmed
232
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the charges on September 26, 2008 the ICC and the parties commenced
preparations for the trial.245 This includes the disclosure of evidence, and the
protection of witnesses and information. Mr. Katanga challenged the
admissibility of the case against him on the basis that he was already
prosecuted for similar offences in his country.246 The court held a public
hearing on the challenge and all the parties to the case participated.247 His
contention was dismissed on the basis that there was no case opened against
him in the DRC.248 He appealed the decision.249 Mr. Katanga was turned over
to the ICC on October 17, 2007 and Mr. Chui on February 6, 2008.250 Their
trials commenced on November 24, 2009.251
(b) Central African Republic
In Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo the accused was arrested
on May 24, 2008 and charged as a co-perpetrator of war crimes (murder,
torture, rape and pillage) and crimes against humanity (murder and rape).252
The pre-trial chamber II started a hearing to confirm the charges on January
12, 2009 but the matter was adjourned.253 The chamber asked the prosecutor
to consider amending the charges on the basis that the facts of the case were
more likely to establish a different form of criminal responsibility (command
responsibility).254 It confirmed the charges on June 15, 2009 but declined to
confirm torture as a war crime.255 The prosecutor appealed the chamber’s
unfavourable ruling on June 22, 2009. Mr. Gombo’s trial commenced eight
months later.256
(c) Sudan
the Court if that person: (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally
responsible”).
244
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In Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda the accused was summoned on
May 17, 2009 to appear before the ICC for allegations that he is responsible as
a rebel commander for crimes committed against AU Peace-keepers in
Haskanita, Darfur.257 His first appearance was on May 18, 2009.258 The
hearing for confirmation of charges took place on October 19, 2009.259 The
ICC has declined to confirm the charges against the accused and subsequent
appeals by the prosecutor have also been unsuccessful.260
A general view has emerged within the international community that
war crime tribunals have been “too slow to investigate, charge and prosecute”
offenders.261 In Alex Whiting’s words:
Delays in bringing perpetrators to justice can diminish the
deterrent value of such prosecutions, undermine the quality of
the evidence in the case, allow perpetrators to continue living in
impunity and continue committing crimes, discourage and
marginalize the victims, and lead to a squandering of the
world’s interests and attention which will, in time, be diverted
to other crises.262
Indeed, the fact that there have been no convictions since the ICC’s conception
seven years ago, coupled with the delays in the commencement of trials, may
appear unsatisfactory. However, these delays should be looked at objectively
by taking into account all the factors that sometimes affect a trial rather than
simply advocating for speeding up trials. Ignoring essential rights such as due
process and the right to challenge evidence and procedural issues can
potentially compromise the credibility of the proceedings. For example,
Saddam Hussein’s rushed trial and execution for crimes against humanity was
labeled as being “flawed and unsound.”263 Further, the protection of all parties
to a trial has to be guaranteed, including witnesses and victims, to preempt a
situation such as that in Iraq where three defense attorneys were assassinated in
Saddam’s case.264 This is a clear example of a sham proceeding. The Lubanga
case was delayed, inter alia, because the prosecutor failed to disclose certain
evidence to the defense. The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski articulated that
“both parties must be given equal opportunity in relation to the evidence
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tendered by the other.”265 Accordingly, the accused person in the Lubanga case
had a right to challenge the proceedings in order to vindicate his fair trial
rights. It is thus submitted that the delays, such as the one in the Lubanga case,
are unavoidable in a system that is cognisant of, inter alia, fair trial rights and
the legitimacy of the proceedings.
Other problems or inescapable delays can also be caused by the gravity
and complexity of the war crimes themselves.266 Prosecution of war crimes is
also a “project in its infancy.”267 This view does not suggest that all delays are
unavoidable or unreasonable. Therefore, there is a need to treat each case
based on its facts and merits. According to Alex Whiting, “in war crimes cases,
delay can be essential for allowing the truth to emerge . . . [and thus] the goal
should be to determine whether justice requires expediency, some degree of
delay or the balance of the two.”268 This view is supported because these
crimes often occur in times of conflict and in most cases criminal justice is
often non-existent and/or not independent after the war. Further, even after the
war, it is difficult to conduct quick investigations where perpetrators (i.e., the
Sudanese conflict) are still in power. For example, investigators have struggled
to gain access in Sudan and they have relied on witnesses who are outside of
the country.269 It is also difficult to prove mass crimes when “the very
existence of the crimes is denied by the accused and establishing the link
between the crimes and perpetrators can be an enormous undertaking,” largely
because the accused, in a high-level positions, are generally not direct
participants in the crimes.270 This is the position taken by the accused persons
before the ICC. They have all entered a plea of not guilty and claim that they
are innocent.
Though the prosecution usually begins by trying small fish, the
ultimate goal of war crimes prosecutors is to “bring to justice the highest-level
commanders responsible for the commission of the crimes.”271
The ICC’s one-sided focus on the African continent is troubling and is
a grave concern for the credibility and independence of the court. The ICC’s
focus on Africa has been dubbed as “pursuing its own brand of justice.”272 As
discussed earlier, regardless of referrals from the state parties, the ICC should
have foreseen the dangers of indicting African leaders given the historical
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political clouds that have surrounded previous international criminal
tribunals.273 Accordingly, the ICC has tarnished its own legitimacy.
In light of the above, the international community’s expectations
should be realistic and not demand quick action in isolation of the unavoidable
circumstances of each case nor disregard that the accused person also has the
right to a fair trial including the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.
Further, justice should not be measured by the number of convictions but by
the legitimacy of the proceedings from investigation until sentencing. The
court is functioning, investigations are underway and three trials have
commenced.
PART III: COOPERATION OF STATE PARTIES WITH THE ICC
Expressing the difficulties associated with executing arrest warrants,
then judge of the ICTY McDonald opined that, “[w]hen we issue an arrest
warrant, it’s just disregarded.”274 This indicates that an international court is
largely dependant on state cooperation. The ICTY had then handed down
seventy-seven indictments but only ten suspects were in custody.275
The ICC has no police force, inter alia, to execute warrants of arrest
issued by it.276 This is a clear illustration that the efficiency of the ICC is
largely dependent on state cooperation and the international community. It is
inconceivable that the prosecutor of the court would enter a sovereign state
without approval from said country to conduct his investigations. Speaking for
the ITCR and ICTY, Dagmar Stroh said that “the courts were fully functional
after overcoming several initial problems [sic]” but highlighted that
cooperation of states remains an “indispensable requirement for efficient
proceedings.”277 Indeed, the ICC’s work depends primarily on the support of
member states and non-state parties (when requested by the Security Council
or the ICC) to function expeditiously.278 The obligations to cooperate with the
court are listed in various provisions of the Rome Statute including Article 86
that in part provides:
States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this
Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court279.
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In light of the binding nature of the aforesaid provision, state parties are
obliged to assist the ICC with any support that it has sought. Cooperation with
the ICC includes provisional arrest, and the identification of the whereabouts
of the suspects.280 It is unfortunate that the AU has urged its members (who are
also parties to the Rome Statute) not to cooperate with the court in executing
warrants of arrest and surrendering of President Al Bashir.281 Consequently,
the court is unable to apprehend the Sudanese and other suspects in the African
region. It is thus evident that without the members states support, the ICC
would be toothless.
Security Council referrals affect the ICC
The Security Council bears the primary responsibility for maintaining
international peace and stability.282 It has discretionary powers under Chapter
VII to, inter alia, determine the existence of threat to any peace,283 and decide
what measures to take without use of force in order to implement its decisions
and making referrals to the ICC.284
The Security Council’s referrals are arguably problematic because a
state that has not ratified the Rome Statute is able to participate and vote in the
Security Council’s meetings regarding a matter that is to be referred to the
ICC. The Security Council, pursuant to Chapter VII provisions of the UN
Charter referred the case of Sudan to the ICC in 2005 and “urged all member
States and non-member States to the Rome Statute to cooperate fully” with the
court.285 Support has not been forthcoming. Despite several difficulties that the
prosecutor of the ICC has brought to the attention of the Security Council
about having no access to Sudan, the Security Council has not engaged any
approach that has resulted in the arrest of the suspects.286
The Security Council has so far only made referrals to the ICC but has
never taken any tough follow-up steps to enforce compliance with the ICC.287
There is arguably less progress on cases (with the exception of Lubanga case
which is on trial) referred to the ICC by the Security Council. Elizabeth
Minogue suggests that the Security Council “could invoke its Chapter VII
authority to order forces to cooperate with and assist an international court in
any way possible” such as ordering the forces deployed in Sudan to search for
280
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indictees or aid the prosecutor with his investigations.”288 This proposition is
only supported to the extent that the Security Council should further attempt to
enforce compliance with the ICC’s requests for international support. This
could be in a form of diplomatic isolations with any state that refuses to arrest
and surrender suspects to the ICC. The proposition that deployed forces should
assist with carrying out investigations is not supported. Soldiers are generally
not experts on carrying out investigations. The nature of the crimes allegedly
committed requires skill. Lack or absence of expertise may negatively affect
the gathering of evidence. Conducting investigations might be a too heavy a
burden on deployed forces that are expected to bring stability.
AU and the ICC
There have been mixed reactions regarding the ICC and its intervention
in Africa, it has been labelled as a “tool of imperialists pursuing its own brand
of justice at the cost of enflaming war and disregarding the interests of
victims.”289 This presumably suggests that the ICC is a foreign Court that was
created for only prosecuting Africa. The AU has publicly urged its members
not to cooperate with the ICC’s regarding the arrest of President Al Bashir, in
Sudan.290 The basis for such attacks on the ICC and refusal to cooperate with it
need to be assessed. There is no doubt that atrocities are being committed in
the Africa. The attacks thus should not be on the ICC’s involvement in Africa,
but rather to encourage it to expand its scope of focus beyond Africa and to
other regions where atrocities are also committed.
International case law291 has confirmed that genocide and crimes
against humanity are violations of jus cogens norms – “overriding norms” that
prevail over any other norms.292 These norms also entail erga omnes duties of
states that are obligations not only owed to victims but to all states and the
international community as well.293 Accordingly, all states have a clear
288
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obligation that is owed to the international community to prohibit atrocities
including arresting President Al Bashir and surrendering him to the ICC. The
AU seems to be relying on the impunity provisions accorded to heads of states
under Article 98 of the Rome Statute to justify its refusal to cooperate with the
ICC.294 It is submitted that the AU’s reliance under Article 98 of the Rome
Statute as erroneous because all members of the United Nations have an
obligation to abide by the decisions of the Security Council.295 Further, the AU
seems to be contending that as much as Chad and Kenya (both state parties to
the Rome Statute and members of the AU) are AU members that are obliged
under the UN Charter to adhere to the United Nations resolutions, they are also
bound to comply with the decisions of the AU arising from Article 23 (2) of
the Constitutive Act of the African Union which imposes sanctions on member
states who fail to comply with the decisions and policies of the AU.296 This
argument is also mistaken because it fails to acknowledge that when there is a
conflict of between the UN Charter and other international agreements, the
obligations flowing from the UN Charter prevail.297 As was found by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States
of America that “members of the United Nations are obliged to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council . . . the obligations of the Parties
in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other international
agreement, including the Montreal Convention.”298
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As things stands, it appears that the discussions about the establishment
of the African Court of Justice on Human Rights (ACJ) will slowly but surely
gain momentum.299 The ACJ is to exercise jurisdiction over international
crimes committed on the African continent.300 The danger with the ACJ is that
individuals and non-governmental organizations will not be able to bring
complaints directly to the court but will have to do so via the AU.301 The
accessibility is thus made unreasonably difficult. The move to create the ACJ
is arguably going to shield those who have committed atrocities from being
apprehended and handed over to the ICC. The reason for this is, in my view,
that the AU has been too lenient and slow to act against those who commit
gross violations of human rights in the region. Should the ACJ come into
existence, it remains unclear on what will happen to the African countries that
have ratified the Rome Statute because there will be two tribunals with
jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. It is also doubtful
whether the AU will act against President Al Bashir and other suspects as it
has done nothing so far to assist the ICC with executing warrants of arrest. The
ACJ will thus be dependent on the political will of AU members to prosecute
those who commit atrocities.
Part IV: Resolution on the Crime of Aggression: Two Steps Forward,
Three Steps Back
The Rome Statute was not a first attempt to define the crime of
aggression, the efforts started in 1919 after World War I, in an attempt to
prosecute German Kaizer Willem II for “a supreme offence against
international morality and sanctity of treaties.”302 Mr. Willem found refuge in
the Netherlands and requests for his extradition were turned down.303 The
efforts to try him thus failed.304 Crime of aggression was also recognised in the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (the Nuremberg Trials) as having
been codified in 1923 in the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (TMA).305 The
TMA proclaimed that “aggressive war [was] an international crime,” and that
“the parties would undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its
commission.”306 The accused persons at the Nuremberg Trials were charged,
inter alia, for crimes against peace that was defined as “planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
299
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international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”307 Twelve
accused were convicted.308 This was the first time that the crime of aggression
was successfully prosecuted but the trials thereafter were labelled as
“unprincipled” because of, inter alia, the ambiguity of the offences.309 The
International Military Tribunal for the Far East also tried and convicted
twenty-three accused persons for having committed the crime of aggression.310
Despite the convictions in both the aforesaid trials, the tribunals did not define
the crime of aggression.311 The United Nations General Assembly three
attempts to define the crime of aggression were unsuccessful.312 It was only on
July 11, 2010, when the international community reached a consensus on the
definition of the crime of aggression in Kampala, Uganda.313
This is a big development towards pre-empting states from invading
other countries outside the permissible grounds, such as the right of individual
or collective self-defense against an armed attack, set forth in the UN
Charter.314 Acts of aggression that have arguably been committed include the
contentious invasion of Iraq by the United States of America in 2003.
However, nothing could be done to bring the perpetrators of the crime of
aggression before the ICC pending an international agreement on the definition
and the elements of the crime.
The new definition provides a detailed attempt to highlight
circumstances under which the crime of aggression can be committed, but is
not immune from criticisms for, inter alia, being too broad. Article 8 bis of the
amendment to the Rome Statute defines the crime of aggression as follows:
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the
political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
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other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration
of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974,
qualify as an act of aggression:
a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State
or part thereof;
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State
against the territory of another State;
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed
forces of another State;
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or
air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory
beyond the termination of the agreement;
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has
placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other
State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.315
The above definition arguably reflects developments from the criminal charges
instituted against the accused persons at the Nuremberg Trials. The present
definition is to a large extent more precise in that it provides various
circumstances under which an act of aggression can be committed. It also
appears from the definition that the crime of aggression can only be committed
by a state and not a non-state actor such as mercenaries.316
Michael Glennon’s concerns on the draft definition of crime of
aggression adopted by the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression
in 2009 seems to have not been addressed despite the fact that there has been a
consensus on the definition.317 According to him:
“[p]reparation for armed conflict armed conflict engages more
than military and defense ministry personnel. Intelligence
315
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agencies provide a wide variety of information to defence
planners that advance military objectives . . . . Lawyers advise
policy makers what use of force is lawful. Who among them
incurs criminal liability for planning or preparing the crime of
aggression? Where is the line drawn?”318
This view is supported. It would arguably be difficult to determine who should
bear the greatest criminal liability for the planning or preparing of acts that
constitute the crime of aggression. Another difficulty is that Article 8(1) bis,
inter alia, requires that the preparation and planning of an act of aggression be
manifest in its character and gravity of scale. These terms are not defined;
there are no guidelines on what precisely is meant by manifest and gravity of
scale and which factors need to be taken into account to ascertain manifest and
gravity of scale. They are thus open to debate and various interpretations can
be applied. A defendant would arguably face an unknown and difficult case
because the aforesaid undefined terms, in my view, still needs to be dissected.
The prosecution will also have a difficult task of proving conduct that qualifies
as “an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations” under Article 8(1)
above.
Article 8(2) bis further provide seven theories (a-g) under which an act
of aggression may be committed. The relevant parts which were absent from
the criminal charges at the Nuremberg Trials are subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c)
that list acts that would qualify as an act of aggression;
“(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State
or part thereof;
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State
against the territory of another State;
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed
forces of another State . . . .”319
The above three theories are noticeable developments from the Nuremberg
Trials because they extend the circumstances under which an act of aggression
can be committed. Despite these developments, there are other concerns.
Firstly, there is no clarity about the number of victims that have to be
injured/present by the state allegedly committing an act of aggression under
subparagraph (b) (i.e., bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the
territory of another State). Secondly, the attack by the armed forces in
318
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subparagraph (d) (i.e., an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea
or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State) is silent on whether
material support, such as financing armed forces, to attack on the land of
another state would also qualify an act of aggression. There are no guidelines
regarding the factors which need to be considered in assessing what constitutes
substantial involvement under subparagraph (g) (i.e. the sending by, or on
behalf of, a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which
carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount
to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein). Would the
sending of only ten mercenaries or armed groups constitute substantial
involvement and thereby qualify as an act of aggression? How would the
mercenaries be linked to a particular state because they are presumably not
easily recognised and their employer, is unknown? These are just some of the
issues that will perhaps be a subject of litigation and prove difficult to provide
a precise meaning for.
In considering the accomplishments of the ICC and the crime of
aggression in the Rome Statue, the resolution on a definition of the crime of
aggression represents a step in the right direction. However, the terms that
have been used in the provision are a clear indication that the agreement is a
product of prolonged negotiations and compromise. This significantly takes
away from the accomplishment. With the ICC struggling with the practical
implementation of seemingly clear provisions in the Rome Statute, the
inclusion of an overly broad provision does not do much to assist it. These are
some of the challenges surrounding the new definition. In a tongue in cheek
manner, academics have welcomed the Review Conference for having
produced “complicated and incoherent provisions” that will assist them in
writing journal articles.320
Jurisdiction
Article 15 bis concerns the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression.321 However, the problem with the jurisdiction provision is that the
state party to the Rome Statute would have an option to make a declaration to
the effect that it does not accept the court’s jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression. Kevin Jon Heller is of the view that the factors surrounding the
exercise of jurisdiction make it hard to believe that “any significant act of
aggression will ever be prosecuted.”322 In developing his assessment, he
320
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favorably summarises the provision of jurisdiction (or what he refers to as optout (OO) clause) as follows:










State Party & State Party  Jurisdiction
State Party & State Party OO  Jurisdiction
State Party & Non-State Party  No Jurisdiction
State Party OO & State Party  No Jurisdiction
State Party OO & State Party OO  No Jurisdiction
State Party OO & Non-State Party  No Jurisdiction
Non-State Party & State Party  No Jurisdiction
Non-State Party & State Party OO No Jurisdiction
Non-State Party & Non-State Party No Jurisdiction.323

The summary shows that the ICC will have jurisdiction on a state party that
commits an act of aggression against another state party and vice versa. This
would apply if both states parties have not made a declaration exempting them
from the court’s jurisdiction. A state party that commits an act of aggression
against the state party that has made a declaration not to accept the ICC’s
jurisdiction will be prosecuted.324 Where a state party that has declared not to
accept the ICC’s jurisdiction commits an act of aggression against a state party,
the ICC will have no jurisdiction.325 Where a non-state party commits an act of
aggression against state party that has made a declaration not to accept the
ICC’s jurisdiction, the court will not prosecute vice versa.
This is an indication that the jurisdiction clause was highly debated. For
example, some of the delegates at the Kampala Conference made a proposal
“aimed at divorcing draft Article 8 bis from customary international criminal
law and purported to explicitly exclude certain instances of state use of force
from the definition of the crime of aggression.”326 There was nonetheless no
agreement.327 The option not to accept jurisdiction arguably renders the
prosecution for aggression redundant. For example, a state may decide to ratify
the Rome Statute but make a reservation on the crime of aggression
jurisdiction thus shielding its leaders from prosecution. It is unfortunate that
even if a state has ratified the Rome Statute, it would still have an option not to
accept the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression. Therefore, it
seems unlikely that there will be a prosecution brought for the crime of
aggression in the near future.
Given the complexity of the crime of aggression and the fact that some
states (for example the United States of America in Afghanistan and Iraq) are
323
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still at war with other countries, this was arguably the best compromise that
was possible. These are nonetheless achievements.
PART V: OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION
There are many achievements that the international community can
reflect on since 2002. But, there are challenges remain. Today, the
international community speaks of an existing and functioning, permanent
international criminal court. Three complex trials are underway including that
of recruiting child soldiers to take part in the war in DRC. The French
authorities recently arrested a Congolese national, Mr. Callixte Mbarushimana
and handed him over to the ICC to answer charges of crimes against humanity
(murder, torture, rape and persecution) and war crimes (attacks against the
civilian population). The confirmation of charges hearing against six Kenyan
suspects is scheduled for September 2011.328 Despite an absolute lack of
cooperation from the Sudanese government, the prosecutor has managed to
conduct and gather information from various Sudanese people who are outside
of the country. Further, investigations are underway in, inter alia, DRC,
Uganda, Libya and CRA. In Uganda, the ICC’s intervention has forged room
for peace talks with the rebels.329 The prosecutor is also monitoring the
situation in Colombia, Georgia, Chad, Afghanistan and Nigeria.330 The
Security Council recently referred the situation in Libya for investigations of
crimes against humanity.331 The ICC’s involvement in Ivory Coast prior the
2010 conflict did decrease violence.332
The office of the prosecutor has adopted a thematic approach by
prosecuting one particular crime.333 The advantage of this method is that as
these crimes are addressed, the law develops in those specific areas and this
328
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generates significant public awareness concerning those crimes, and, the
defence can face a specific case.334 However, the problem with thematic
prosecution is that victims of other crimes, such as genocide, are left out.335 In
other words, justice for them would not be done because the accused person
would only be prosecuted for war crimes.
Another challenge is that the victims have insufficient knowledge about
the ICC. A population-based survey on attitudes about accountability and
social reconstruction in the CAR revealed, inter alia, the following;
(a) 23% of victims believed that the ICC had been established by the
European community;
(b) 65% of those who knew about the ICC believed that it has its offices in
CAR and that the court could investigate offences committed prior to
2002.336
The lack of knowledge creates unnecessary and unrealistic expectations from
the court and also disappoints the victims. Further, it also creates doubts about
the court’s efficacy.
The fact that it has secured no convictions in eight years of existence
can easily lead to an unjust conclusion that the ICC has failed. Indeed, a court
of law is expected to deliver justice without delay. This is nonetheless a
challenge that cannot be ignored. Like any other judicial body, the ICC also
has its shortfalls. All the current cases before the Court are only from Africa,
despite the fact that atrocities falling within the court’s jurisdiction are also
committed elsewhere. The ICC’s target seems to be ‘small fish’ such as rebels,
warlords and opposition leaders,337 with the exception of Sudan where
President Al Bhashir has been indicted. Arrest warrants have been pending for
too long. There is no cooperation with the court. In fact, the AU has openly
declared that it will not support the court and has also urged its members and
friends of Africa not to cooperate with it.338
The delay in executing warrants of arrest has been caused by lack of
cooperation from state and non-state parties. With regard to the late
commencement of trials, there is nothing that the court could have done
because the defence team has a right to challenge the evidence brought against
the accused person. Therefore, any attempts by the ICC to unreasonably deny
the accused person the exercise of his due process rights (i.e. to challenge
334
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evidence) would have arguably compromised the legitimacy of the
proceedings. Further, the crimes before the ICC including war crimes, are
complex and there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach. As observed by Alex
Whiting, “[t]he expectations of the international community when constructing
war crimes tribunals are critically important, especially since the prosecution
of war crimes is still a project in its infancy.”339 This view is supported. The
international community should be aware that international criminal tribunals
are relatively new. In particular, the ICC is still in its early stages. Therefore,
the delays are also caused by the gravity and complexity of the offences. The
ICC should thus be given a reasonable opportunity to function and then be
evaluated. The consensus on the crime of aggression is a success, although the
definition has broad terms. The option available to states not to accept the
ICC’s jurisdiction seems like it will be the only factor making it an obstacle to
prosecute the crime of aggression.
The successful prosecution of the first trials will arguably restore hope
on the ICC’s work. Its success should not be measured by the delay in securing
a first conviction, but the legitimacy of how it conducts its investigations and
proceedings.
PART VI: RECOMMENDATIONS
The most important thing that the ICC has to do is to maintain its
independence. This could be achieved through conducting its affairs in a
manner that is purely judicial, objective, neutral and non-political. There is,
thus, a need for it to expand its work beyond Africa. The advantage of an
independent court is that the international community will have confidence in
the entire work of the ICC. In the absence of this, the ICC will loose its
credibility and become a place for settling political scores.
All states should respect the ICC’s requests and respond promptly to its
requests even if they are required to concede some loss of sovereignty. This
will assists in eliminating safe havens for suspects. Where requests are ignored,
suspects will walk free and victims will see the ICC as toothless. The court
should also indict heads of states, particularly in Uganda and the DRC. This
will arguably clear the current perception that leaders who make referrals of
cases to the ICC immunize themselves and their cronies from prosecution. This
would send out a clear message that there is no one above the law. The danger
of apprehending heads of states may, however, bring more instability if the
international community apprehends them from their sovereign countries.
The international community should push for the United States of
America, Russia, China and other countries to ratify the Rome Statute in order
to increase global support for the Court. These countries play an important role
as members of the UN, and are influential on Security Council resolutions that
refer some of the cases to the ICC. Therefore, it is arguably unacceptable for a
state that has not ratified the Rome Statute to vote on Security Council
meetings regarding a matter to be referred to the ICC. Further, each state
339
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should ratify the ICC statute to ensure the ICC has independent and effective
power to issue binding orders concerning matters falling within its jurisdiction.
Having all states sign on to the Rome Statute will show a form of unity among
the international community and collective commitment in upholding the rule
of law. The absence of powerful countries in this collective effort arguably
sends a message that the ICC was only established for small countries.
The victims have a perception that the ICC will solve all kinds of
problems including the crimes committed prior to 2002. The court can only
prosecute criminal acts committed after 2002. Accordingly, the court should
increase its outreach programme to all the victims and the international
community to pre-empt this misconception about its scope of prosecution. This
will prevent a situation in which the international community has false
expectations about the Court and gets disappointed in the end. The
international community should condemn the conduct of the United States of
America of entering into bilateral treaties with other countries regarding the
crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
Other lessons from the ICTY and the ICTR are that the court should
consider making plea bargains with the low ranking officials in exchange for
confessions and testimonies against ‘big fish’ and other accused persons. This
will arguably speed up trials. The danger of such a system is that it is open to
abuse. All suspects might end up seeking a plea bargain. The court should also
not focus the lion’s share of its budget on one country by indicting all top
suspects. The focus should be to prosecute those who bear the greatest criminal
responsibility at the ICC and strengthen domestic courts to try low ranking
officials and other high ranking officials if it is in the interest of justice to do
so.
Article 112(4) of the Rome Statute empowers the Assembly to establish
an “independent” oversight mechanism for the ICC to ensure that the Court
performs, inter alia, its functions effectively. In accordance with this
provision, the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties appointed Mr. Akbar
Khan (United Kingdom), with the task of establishing the aforesaid
independent oversight mechanism at its fifth meeting, on December 4, 2008.340
The ICC then circulated a non-paper which recommends that the oversight
mechanism could be an expanded version of the Office of Internal Audit that
will be administered by the Registry.341 This proposal has been met with
concerns regarding the independence of the said mechanism.342 It is arguably
premature to consider the introduction of an oversight body to the ICC. What
will the enforcement agency do when many states have not ratified the Rome
340
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Statute? Therefore, the aforesaid recommendations (including pressurizing
other permanent members in the Security Council to ratify the Rome Statute)
should be a higher priority than the proposed oversight mechanism. Working
on the introduction of an enforcement mechanism at this early stage may,
nonetheless, prove fruitful than considering the idea when the ICC is in dire
need of an enforcement mechanism.
The Security Council should play a more active and effective role, such
as travel restrictions, economic sanctions and diplomatic sanctions on countries
that provide a safe haven for suspects, refuse to arrest indictees, or cooperate
with the ICC. The active role from the Security Council may be a problem
because the Court is not a political body, but the Security Council is a political
one. The active role of the Security Council on matters that fall within the ICC
may thus compromise the Court’s independence.
Today, the international community is speaking about a working court,
with trials underway. There is also an emerging norm of customary
international criminal law that international crimes cannot go unpunished
regardless of the official position occupied by the perpetrator. State
sovereignty, it seems, is no longer a justification to prevent the ICC from
prosecuting those responsible for gross violations of human rights.
Investigations are progressing in Kenya, the DRC, and Sudan. Three new
suspects have been arrested and surrendered to the court. Therefore, the
permanent International Criminal Court has, to a certain extent, been
successful, despite the challenges surrounding it.
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